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  Abstract
This paper discusses the question what should administrative 
bodies do in cases where they have adopted decisions that turn out to be contrary 
to Community law, but these decisions have become final because the parties con-
cerned have not made use of the possibilities of judicial review available to them.
 1 Introduction
What should administrative bodies do in cases where they 
have adopted decisions that turn out to be contrary to Community law, 
but these decisions have become final because the parties concerned have 
not made use of the possibilities of judicial review available to them? The 
reader of this journal is, of course, familiar with the judgment of the Court 
of Justice in the Kühne & Heitz case.1 In Kühne & Heitz (para. 24), the Court 
decided that in certain circumstances, administrative bodies are under an 
obligation to reopen an administrative decision which has become final, 
when this decision is contrary to Community law. This is the case when:
1)  national law confers on the administrative body competence to reopen 
the decision in question, which has become final;
2)  that decision became final only as a result of a judgment of a national 
court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy;
3)  that judgment was based on an interpretation of Community law 
which, in the light of a subsequent judgment of the Court, was incor-
rect and which was adopted without a question being referred to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling in accordance with the conditions 
provided for in the third paragraph of Article 234 EC;
4)  the person concerned complained to the administrative body immedi-
ately after becoming aware of that judgment of the Court.
One of the questions that remained unanswered in Kühne & Heitz – because 
the referring judge in Kühne & Heitz did not raise it – was whether an 
administrative body is also obliged to reopen an earlier incorrect decision 
when the parties concerned did not make use of legal remedies against the 
decision. Elsewhere, one of the present authors stated, following Kühne 
1  Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837.
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& Heitz, that this possibility should not be ruled out completely.2 It is, 
for instance, conceivable that a party concerned could not ‘reasonably’ be 
expected to bring an action against every unfavourable decision, for instance 
when it is completely clear that an action against the decision would be 
unsuccessful.3 Although the Court in Kühne & Heitz referred to the specific 
circumstances of the case, the question remained whether these four criteria 
should be understood to be cumulative, limitative or merely tentative.
 2 Arcor and i-21
In its judgment of 19 September 2006, joined cases C-
392/04 and C-422/04, i-21 Germany GmbH and Arcor AG & Co. KG (here-
inafter Arcor),4 the Court has given further clarity on the scope of the 
obligation to reopen a decision. This judgment is therefore, from the point 
of view of legal analysis, the follow-up to Kühne & Heitz. The facts of the case 
were as follows.
Arcor and i-21 are two telecommunications undertakings that, under 
the German Telekommunikationsgesetz and the Telekommunikations-Lizen-
zgebührenverordnung and by order of the competent German administrative 
body, had been charged high fees (€ 5,420,000 for i-21 and approximately 
€ 67,000 for Arcor) for telecommunications licences granted to them. 
They paid these fees without objection and did not appeal against them 
within the set time-limit of one month. In a different case, meanwhile, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht had held that the Telekommunikations-Lizenzge-
bührenverordnung was not compatible with higher-ranking legal rules: the 
Telekommunikationsgesetz and the German Constitution. Subsequently, Arcor 
and i-21 sought repayment of the fees which they had paid. Their claims 
were not granted. They both, subsequently, brought individual proceedings 
before the Verwaltungsgericht, which dismissed the appeals on the ground 
that the fee notices had become final and that in the present situation there 
were no grounds for challenging the administrative body’s refusal to with-
draw those assessments. Under German law, administrative bodies, pursu-
ant to § 48 of the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, have discretion to withdraw 
2  J.H. Jans & K.J. de Graaf, ‘Bevoegdheid = verplichting? Enkele opmerkingen over de 
uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie in de zaak Kühne & Heitz’, NTER 2004, p. 98-102.
3  It can be concluded from the judgment of the Court, cf. Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-
410/98 Metallgesellschaft [2001] ECR I-1727, that this idea is not unknown in the European 
legal order. See on this topic in more detail J.H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal & R.J.G.M. 
Widdershoven Europeanisation of Public Law, Groningen 2007, p. 356. The basic idea 
– interested parties cannot be required to take unreasonable action – is also at the basis of 
the recent judgment of the Court in the Placanica case, Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 & 
C-360/04, judgment of 6 March 2007, (para. 67).
4  [2006] ECR I-8559. 
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an unlawful administrative act which has become final. This discretion 
may, however, be reduced to zero if upholding the act in question would be 
‘outright intolerable’ (in German: ‘slechthin unerträglich’) in respect of public 
policy, good faith, fairness, equal treatment or manifest unlawfulness.5
The central question that was put to the Court of Justice by the Bundes-
verwaltungsgericht was whether Article 10 EC should be interpreted to mean 
that a fee assessment that determines certain fees (as described in the first 
question put to the ECJ) and which has not been contested, although such 
a possibility is afforded under national law, must be set aside where that is 
permissible, but not mandatory, under national law.
It is now at least clear from Arcor that the requirement to make use 
of legal remedies is extremely strict. In para. 53, the Court notes that the 
crucial difference between Arcor and Kühne & Heitz is precisely the fact that 
“i-21 and Arcor did not avail themselves of their right to appeal against the 
fee assessments issued to them” while “Kühne & Heitz NV had exhausted 
all legal remedies available to it”. The Court continues in para. 54: “Accord-
ingly, contrary to the argument advanced by i-21, the judgment in Kühne & 
Heitz is not relevant for the purposes of determining whether, in a situation 
such as that in the main proceedings, an administrative body is under an 
obligation to review decisions which have become final”(emphasis added). 
This is a very elegant way of saying that the Court still supports the judg-
ment in Kühne & Heitz, which was heavily criticized in academic writing, 
but does not wish to enlarge the scope of it beyond the specific circum-
stances of Kühne & Heitz itself.
Thus, even if there is competence under § 48 Verwaltungsverfahrensge-
setz, there is no general obligation for an administrative body to reopen an 
earlier unlawful decision, when this decision, upon expiry of the time-limits 
for legal remedies, has acquired “formal” legal force, i.e. has become final. 
The rationale behind this is to be found in the principle of legal certainty. 
According to the Court, para. 51, compliance with the principle of legal 
certainty prevents administrative acts that produce legal effects from being 
called into question indefinitely.6
Incidentally, another case that can be mentioned in this context is the 
Kapferer case.7 It is apparent from that case that when the decision has 
become final, after exhaustion of all legal remedies (res judicata) the afore-
mentioned obligation does not exist either (a fortiori, it may be said). It thus 
seems necessary to redefine Kühne & Heitz. Everything seems to indicate 
that the significance of Kühne & Heitz is limited, and that this judgment 
does not affect the rule that a violation of norms of Community law is in 
itself insufficient to consider an administrative body obliged to reopen 
5  Cf. Hartmut Maurer, Algemeines Verwaltungsrecht, München 2006, p. 324-327. 
6  Cf. Case C-310/97 P Commission v. AssiDomän Kraft Products a.o. [1999] ECR I-5363, para. 
61.
7  Case C-234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I-2585.
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unlawful decisions. We have already heard of the ‘rise and fall of Emmott’; 
now, because of Arcor, it is the turn of Kühne & Heitz!
 3 Competence Remains Competence?
So, let us return to Kühne & Heitz. That judgment was char-
acterised by ambiguity of reasoning regarding the basis for the Court’s deci-
sion. In Kühne & Heitz the Court only referred to Article 10 EC in general 
terms, and it did not become clear why the Court believed that, in this case, 
the Dutch administrative body’s competence under national law (Article 4:6 
Algemene wet bstuursrecht (Awb); General Administrative Law Act) to reopen 
a previous decision, was transformed into an obligation to do so. In this con-
text we may also mention the inaugural lecture by Jans, in which the Court 
was accused of not having sufficiently clarified why it believes that, start-
ing from the well-known principle of procedural autonomy, in some cases 
national administrative procedural law can ‘simply’ be applied (competence 
remains competence) and in some cases it cannot (competence becomes 
obligation).8 In this case too, parties disagreed on the question of whether 
the German administrative law in question should be judged according to 
the ‘strict’ approach based on the principle of primacy, or that the Court 
should apply the more ‘flexible’ and ‘Member State-friendly’ approach of the 
Rewe/Comet principle (paras. 44-48):
‘44  i-21 maintains that to uphold such an administrative act is contrary to 
the principle of the primacy of Community law and the need to maintain its 
effectiveness. It submits that even if the Court acknowledges the importance 
of the principle of legal certainty, the latter does not in every case outweigh 
the principle of lawfulness. i-21 points out that, in the judgment in Kühne & 
Heitz, cited above, the Court considered that an administrative act which had 
acquired binding force following a judgment which could not be the subject 
of an appeal could be annulled, in certain circumstances, if it were contrary to 
Community law. i-21 takes the view that this possibility becomes even greater 
in the case of an administrative act which was not the subject of a judicial 
decision and which became final merely upon expiry of the time-limits allowed 
for appealing.
45  Arcor considers, for its part, that the judgment in Kühne & Heitz is 
not relevant inasmuch as it concerns an indirect conflict between a rule of 
national procedure and a rule of substantive Community law, the first rule 
preventing application of the second. According to Arcor, the case in the main 
8  J.H. Jans, Doorgeschoten? Enkele opmerkingen over de gevolgen van de Europeanisering van het 
bestuursrecht voor de grondslagen van de bestuursrechtspraak (inaugural lecture, University of 
Groningen), Groningen 2005, in particular p. 24-27. 
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proceedings should be regarded as a direct conflict between two rules of 
substantive law. Article 11(1) of Directive 97/1, read in the light of Article 10 
EC, requires fees levied in breach of Article 11 to be repaid, while the national 
legislation prohibits such reimbursement. Arcor takes the view that Commu-
nity law should, in such a case, prevail over conflicting national law.
46  The Commission maintains, on the other hand, that the judgment in 
Kühne & Heitz is a suitable starting point and points out that, in principle, an 
administrative act which has not been challenged within the time-limits laid 
down should not be withdrawn. The Commission goes on to state that, in 
the present case, it must be ascertained whether upholding the unlawful fee 
assessments should nevertheless be considered to be ‘outright intolerable’ 
in the light of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/1 and that that question should be 
examined in the light of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
47  In relation to the principle of equivalence, the Commission submits that, 
according to German law, an administrative act which is manifestly unlawful 
under national law cannot be upheld. If that examination were also carried out 
in the light of Community law, the result would, in the Commission’s view, be 
that the fee assessments at issue in the main proceedings and the legislation 
on which they are based would have to be considered to be manifestly unlaw-
ful in the light of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/1. 
48  The Commission arrives at the same conclusion as regards the principle 
of effectiveness. It takes the view that to uphold the fee assessments would 
make it practically impossible to exercise the rights derived from Article 11(1) 
of the directive, by allowing an overcompensation which leads to restricting 
competition over a period of 0 years.’
The ‘competence=obligation-case law’ is a kind of black box, and this case 
does not make it any more transparent. Such a lack of transparency means 
that it is always difficult to predict what the next decision of the Court 
will be in cases where the principle of legal certainty and the effective and 
uniform application of European law come into conflict because of national 
procedural law.9
Another notable aspect is the difference in approach within Arcor itself 
between, on the one hand, the question of whether an obligation to reopen 
exists under European law and, on the other hand, the question of how the 
national courts should act in conformity with the principle of equivalence 
if an obligation to reopen exists under national law. Under German admin-
istrative law an obligation exists to withdraw an administrative act that is 
unlawful under national law, even if it has become final, when upholding 
the act would be ‘outright intolerable’. On this issue, the Court ruled as 
follows:
9  Cf. for instance this case with Case C-119/05 Lucchini SpA, judgment of 18 July 2007, nyr. 
See in particular the opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed of 14 September 2006.
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‘64  It is clear from the information provided by the national court that, 
for the purposes of construing the term outright intolerable, the national 
court examined whether upholding the fee assessments at issue in the main 
proceedings ran counter to the national legal principles of equal treatment, 
fairness, public policy or good faith, and whether the incompatibility of the fee 
assessments with rules of higher-ranking law was manifest. 
65  As regards the principle of equal treatment, the Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht considers that there is no breach of that principle in so far as undertak-
ings such as i-21 and Arcor, whose fee assessments have been upheld, had not 
exercised their right to challenge those assessments. They are therefore not 
in a situation comparable to that of undertakings which, having exercised that 
right, succeeded in having the fee assessments which had been addressed to 
them withdrawn.
66  Such an application of the principle of equal treatment provided for 
in the legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not differ according 
to whether the dispute relates to a situation arising under national law or to 
a situation arising under Community law and therefore does not appear to 
breach the principle of equivalence.
67  Moreover, it was not alleged that the principles of public policy, good 
faith or fairness were applied differently according to the nature of the dispute. 
68  However, the question has been raised as to whether the concept of 
manifest unlawfulness was applied in an equivalent manner. According to 
the Commission, the national court examined whether the fee assessments 
were based on legislation that was manifestly unlawful with regard to rules of 
higher-ranking law, namely the TKG and German constitutional law, but did 
not or did not correctly conduct that examination with regard to Community 
law. The Commission maintains that the legislation is manifestly unlawful with 
regard to the provisions of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/1 and that the principle 
of equivalence has therefore not been complied with.
69  Where, pursuant to rules of national law, the administration is required 
to withdraw an administrative decision which has become final if that decision 
is manifestly incompatible with domestic law, that same obligation must exist 
if the decision is manifestly incompatible with Community law. 
70  In order to assess the degree of clarity of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/1 
and to determine whether or not the incompatibility of the national law with 
that article is manifest, the objectives of that directive, which is among the 
measures adopted for the complete liberalisation of telecommunications 
services and infrastructures and is intended to encourage the entry of new 
operators onto the market, must be taken into account (see, to that effect, 
Albacom and Infostrada, cited above in paragraph 5). In that regard, the 
imposition of a very high fee to cover an estimation of the general costs over 
a period of 0 years is such as to seriously impair competition, as the national 
court points out in its references for a preliminary ruling, and constitutes a 
relevant factor in that assessment.
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71   It is for the national court, in the light of the foregoing, to ascertain 
whether legislation which is clearly incompatible with Community law, such as 
that on which the fee assessments at issue in the main proceedings is based, 
constitutes manifest unlawfulness within the meaning of the national law 
concerned.’
As to this question, the Court appears, in a formal sense at least, to merely 
give the national court guidelines on how to act. According to para. 71 “it 
is for the national court […] to ascertain whether legislation which is clearly 
incompatible with Community law […] constitutes manifest unlawfulness 
within the meaning of the national law concerned”.10 However, it seems as 
though it could be inferred, particularly from para. 70, that the Court was 
under the assumption that the national court would come to the conclu-
sion that the high fee is manifestly incompatible with Community law and 
that the administrative body will thus have to withdraw the decision. This, 
however, was not how the story ended. In a judgment of 17 January 2007 the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht decided that the national legislation in question 
did not constitute manifest unlawfulness within the meaning of the relevant 
national law (§ 48 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz).11 According to the Bundesver-
waltungsgericht the concept of manifest unlawfulness implies that there was 
no reasonable doubt – at the time the contested decision was taken – about 
its infringement of the law.12 Applying this to the case at hand it came to the 
conclusion that it could not be maintained that at the time of the contested 
decision there was no reasonable doubt that the German telecom legislation 
involving high fees was incompatible with Article 11 of Directive 97/13. The 
incompatibility with EC law was only revealed by the judgment of the Court 
in Arcor itself, and in earlier case law pertinent to the directive.13 According 
to the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the complexity of the reasoning of the Court 
of Justice proved that the incompatibility was not at all evident. Finally, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, relied on a judgment of the Oberverwaltungsgericht 
Münster14 – which had decided that the German legislation was compatible 
– in reaching its decision that the national legislation in question did not 
constitute manifest unlawfulness within the meaning of § 48 Verwaltungs-
verfahrensgesetz.
10  Emphasis added.
11  BVerwG 6 C 33.06
12  Para. 14 of the judgment: “Eine offensichtliche Rechtswidrigkeit in diesem Sinne ist 
anzunehmen, wenn an dem Verstoß der streitigen Maßnahme gegen formelles oder mater-
ielles Recht vernünftigerweise kein Zweifel besteht und sich deshalb die Rechtswidrigkeit 
aufdrängt. […] Maßgeblicher Zeitpunkt für die Beurteilung, ob sich der Verwaltungsakt als 
offensichtlich rechtswidrig erweist, ist in der Regel – und so auch hier – der Zeitpunkt des 
Erlasses des Verwaltungsakts.”
13  Joined Cases C-292/01 and C-293/02 Albacom & Infostrada [2003] ECR I-9449.
14  Judgment of 27 October 1999 (13 B 843/99), MMR 2000, 115.
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We agree with Taborowski that the Bundesverwaltungsgericht seems to 
stay within the margin of discretion granted by the ECJ in para. 71 of the 
judgment.15 If a decision of an administrative body is ‘clearly incompatible 
with Community law’ it does not imply automatically also ‘manifest unlaw-
fulness within the meaning of § 48 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz’. And we do 
agree, with both the ECJ and the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, that is for the 
latter to decide on whether this incompatibility qualifies under § 48 Verwal-
tungsverfahrensgesetz or not. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that 
the Bundesverwaltungsgericht is completely free. The two tests have to be 
distinguished from each other and are not the same; but on the other hand 
they are interrelated and not dissimilar either. It is the authors’ view that 
there is no evidence in the judgment that the Court of Justice is of the opin-
ion that the degree of clarity of the infringement has varied over the years. 
Arguably, the Court is of the opinion that the incompatibility of the German 
legislation is as clear now as it was at the moment the legislation came into 
force. Therefore we are not completely sure that the Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
has understood the ECJ’s judgment in Arcor in the way it was intended by 
the Court. Even though the Court of Justice stated that the national court 
itself must decide whether the refusal of the German authorities to reopen 
incorrect decisions on grounds of European law is “outright intolerable”, and 
thus unlawful, the strong guidance given by the Court could have been, or 
even should have been, interpreted as calling on the Bundesverwaltungsrecht 
to decide that the German authorities must in this case make use of their 
competence to reopen the decision, in a fashion that was not meant to be 
ignored.16
 4  The Consequences of Arcor for Dutch  
Administrative Law
What does this decision mean for Dutch administrative law? 
In the Netherlands, administrative bodies, just as in Germany, have the com-
petence to reopen decisions that have become final. Unlike in Germany, this 
competence is not laid down in elaborate general legislation. We only have 
one general provision in the Algemene wet bestuursrecht (General Administra-
tive Law Act, Awb; Article 4:6), a number of provisions in special laws and 
15  Cf. the case note of M. Taborowski in 44/5 CMLRev. forthcoming.
16  In the same sentence, the Anmerkung by Matthias Ruffert in JZ 8/2007, p. 407 et seq.: 
“Angesichts der deutlichen Hinweise des EuGH wäre es erstaunlich, wenn das BVerwG 
in de abschließenden Entscheidung keine Rücknahmepflicht statuierte, und aus Sicht des 
Gemeinschaftsrechts wie des deutschen Verwaltungsrechts ist dies auch das einzig vertret-
bare Ergebnis.”
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the general principle that administrative bodies – be it with a number of 
limitations – can amend or withdraw, decisions that they have made.17
Article 4:6 paragraph 1 Awb reads: “If a new application is made after an 
administrative decision has been made rejecting all or part of an application, 
the applicant shall state any new facts that have emerged or circumstances 
that have altered.”18 The second paragraph subsequently states: “If no new 
facts or altered circumstances are stated, the administrative authority may, 
without applying Article 4:5, reject the application by referring to its admin-
istrative decision rejecting the previous application.”19 In other words, Article 
4:6 Awb requires that if a concerned party wants the administrative body 
to reopen an earlier unfavourable decision, that party must indicate newly 
discovered facts or a change of circumstances. In the absence thereof, it is 
sufficient for the administrative body, when denying the request, to refer to 
the earlier decision. That consequently means that when there are new facts 
or a change of circumstances, it is not sufficient for the administrative body 
to simply refer to the earlier negative decision.
According to the Court of Justice, for an obligation of administrative 
bodies to reopen or even amend decisions that were adopted in violation of 
rules of European law to exist, it is not sufficient that they have the compe-
tence to do so. What is essential, according to Arcor, is the question under 
which circumstances this competence becomes an obligation. Because if 
that is the case, this obligation should apply equally to decisions taken in 
violation of national law and decisions taken in violation of EC law.
Under German law, the competence becomes an obligation if it would 
be “outright intolerable” that the decision which has become final remains 
unchanged. When are administrative bodies obliged to make use of their 
competence to reopen under Dutch law? Dutch administrative law is unique 
in that there are several different appeal courts, which have different views 
on the matter. The Dutch Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State 
(hereinafter: Raad van State)20 applies as a rigid principle that competence of 
the administrative body can never lead to an obligation to grant a request to 
17  Cf. Dutch Raad van State 12 December 2001, AB 2002, 323, note by Marseille. See 
futhermore K.J. de Graaf & A.T. Marseille, ‘Review of Final Decisions in the Netherlands, 
Germany and Europe’, in: K.J. de Graaf, J.H. Jans, A.T. Marseille, & J. de Ridder, Quality of 
Decision-Making in Public Law; Studies in Administrative Decision-Making in the Netherlands, 
Groningen 2007 (forthcoming).
18  Unofficial translation. The authentic text in Dutch: “Indien na een geheel of gedeeltelijk 
afwijzende beschikking een nieuwe aanvraag wordt gedaan, is de aanvrager gehouden 
nieuw gebleken feiten of veranderde omstandigheden te vermelden.”
19  In Dutch: “Wanneer geen nieuw gebleken feiten of veranderde omstandigheden worden 
vermeld, kan het bestuursorgaan zonder toepassing te geven aan artikel 4:5 de aanvraag 
afwijzen onder verwijzing naar zijn eerdere afwijzende beschikking.”
20  The Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Council of State, Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division) is one of the highest administrative court in the Netherlands. It hears 
84
jans & marseille
reopen a decision.21 For this body, the most important aspect is that when a 
party appeals against the rejection of a request to reopen a decision, it should 
not be able to get the court to rule on this appeal as if it were an appeal 
against the original decision. This would, after all, allow that party to create 
a new right of appeal for himself, which would seriously impair the legal 
certainty for the administrative body and for third parties, who should be 
able to rely on the finality and irrevocability of the decision. The Raad van 
State makes practically no exceptions to this principle in its case law.22 Other 
‘highest’ administrative Courts in the Netherlands are, however, a bit more 
flexible. The Centrale Raad van Beroep23 and the College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven24 are of the opinion that, under certain circumstances, an obli-
gation for an administrative body to reopen a decision that has become final 
may exist. This is the case when it must be concluded that the administra-
tive body could not ‘reasonably’ decide not to make use of that competence, 
or, by not making use of it, has acted in violation of written or unwritten law 
or a general principle of law.25
Seen from this perspective, not every Dutch administrative body is 
equally obliged to reopen decisions that have become final and are incom-
patible with European law. Administrative bodies whose decisions are 
ultimately subject to the judgment of the Raad van State as highest admin-
istrative court would not so easily be under such an obligation as adminis-
trative bodies whose decisions are liable to appeal before the Centrale Raad 
van Beroep or the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven as highest courts of 
appeal.
The differing views of the various Dutch appeal courts regarding the 
obligation for administrative bodies to reopen decisions that have become 
final, leads to two questions. The most obvious question – which was already 
raised by Widdershoven in his annotation of a judgment of the Raad van 
appeals lodged by members of the public against decisions or orders given by municipal, 
provincial or central government.
21  Cf. e.g. Raad van State 4 April 2003, AB 2003, 315, note by Vermeulen. As has been 
noted, the situation is different if a request is based on new facts or altered circumstances. 
However, a judicial decision does not constitute a novum as required under Art. 4:6 Awb; 
Cf. e.g. Raad van State 3 September 1999, AB 2000, 362.
22  Cf. e.g. Raad van State 5 March 2002, AB 2002, 169, note by Sewandono.
23  The Centrale Raad van Beroep, or in English, the Central Appeals Tribunal is a board of 
appeal which is mainly active in legal areas pertaining to social security and the civil 
service. In these areas it is the highest judicial authority.
24  The College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, or in English, the Trade and Industry Appeals 
Tribunal is a special administrative court which rules on disputes in the area of social-
economic administrative law. In addition this appeals tribunal also rules on appeals for 
specific laws, such as the Competition Act and the Telecommunications Act.
25  Cf. e.g. Centrale Raad van Beroep 27 January 2006, RSV 2006/124 and College van Beroep 
voor het bedrijfsleven 22 June 2004, JB 2004/300.
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State of 12 July 200626 – is whether it is a problem under European law that 
different Dutch appeal courts give a different interpretation of provisions 
of national procedural law that are relevant to the application of European 
law. Widdershoven says this is not the case, although he makes a number 
of reservations. Our own view on the obligation of administrative authori-
ties to reopen decisions that have become final, is that, on the one hand, the 
fact that in the Netherlands different highest administrative courts can hold 
different views on this is defensible. After all, if the Court accepts that the 
degree to which substantive European law takes effect can differ from one 
Member State to another (because of the fact that procedural rules of the 
various Member States leave varying degrees of discretion it to the adminis-
trative authorities in handling its implementation), it does not seem obvious 
that the Court would have a problem with the fact that such a difference 
exists within Member States. On the other hand, a difference in approach 
between the various highest national administrative courts does indicate 
inconsistency. And this could also mean that the ‘strict’ interpretation of 
Article 4:6 Awb might be harder to justify. After all, how can one highest 
administrative court justify a ‘stricter’ interpretation, when the other highest 
administrative court takes a more flexible approach?
Then there is the second question. Is it problematic from a European law 
perspective that national courts allow administrative bodies complete free-
dom regarding the exercise of their competence to reopen decisions, as the 
Raad van State does? The judgment does not give a conclusive answer to this 
question, but it seems unlikely that the Court would not find a problem here. 
We refer in this respect to our comments supra on the handling of the Arcor 
judgment by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht.
 5 Conclusion
The Court of Justice in a friendly but firm manner directed 
the German Bundesverwaltungsgericht towards a judgment requiring the 
administrative body to reopen the decision regarding the fees charged to 
i-21 and Arcor. In our opinion, the Court reached a delicate balance between 
the need to ensure effective application of Community law on the one hand, 
and the need to respect national procedural autonomy on the other. We are 
not quite sure whether the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, in its application of 
the Arcor judgment, appreciated the undertone in the Arcor judgment in a 
fully correct manner. True, it was acknowledged explicitly in Arcor that it is 
a matter for the national court to decide whether or not to require admin-
istrative bodies to reopen decisions that have become final. But it cannot 
be assumed that this competence is an unlimited one. In our opinion the 
conclusion of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht that national legislation which 
26  AB 2006, 338
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is ‘clearly incompatible with Community law’ did not imply ‘manifest 
unlawfulness’ within the meaning of § 48 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz is not 
completely convincing and does not explain adequately why the strong guid-
ance given by the Court calling on the Bundesverwaltungsrecht to decide that 
the German authorities must in this case make use of their competence to 
reopen the decision, was ignored after all.
Our final conclusion on the Arcor saga is that if § 48 Verwaltungsverfah-
rensgesetz indeed does not require administrative bodies to reopen decisions 
in situations like that at issue, this triggers the question to what extent § 48 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz itself is still compatible with Community law, 
Article 10 EC in particular. It must be assumed that Community law will 
require national courts to retain at least some room for review of the exercise 
of competence to reopen decisions by the national authorities. It must be 
noted that national legislation that makes withdrawal of decisions that have 
become final (virtually) impossible, is not in compliance with the princi-
ple of loyal cooperation, laid down in Article 10 EC.27 Other Member Sates 
should draw their own conclusions, and act accordingly: if the cap fits, wear 
it!
27  Cf. Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, ‘Die Bestandskraft gemeinschaftsrechtswidriger Verwal-
tungsakte zwischen Kasuistik und Systembildung’, NWVBl. 12/2006, p. 441-449 (p. 446), 
Matthias Ruffert, ‘Anmerkung’ on Case C-234/04, Kapferer in JZ 18/2006, p. 905-906.
